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Abstract: We investigate the relation between self-organization and living processes 
from a systemic perspective. Emphasis is given to Aristotle’s conception of four 
causes in order to provide foundations for a systemic approach to life. From this 
perspective, life is characterized as a self-organizing process that allows the 
emergence and evolution of systems capable of self-locomotion, in the Aristotelian 
sense of moving and growing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The relation between self-organization and living processes cons-
titutes our main subject of investigation in this paper. Based upon Aristotle’s 
characterization of four causes, we investigate the nature of self-organizing 
processes providing a framework for the following hypotheses: 
 
1. The Aristotelian theory of four causes allows us to improve  
aspects of contemporary approaches to life characterized as a self-organized 
process. 
 
2. Life can be understood in terms of self-organizing processes that 
allow the emergence and evolution of systems capable of self-locomotion, in 
the Aristotelian sense of moving and growing. 
 
The hypotheses will be investigated, in Part 1, in the context of 
History of Philosophy, with special emphasis on Aristotle’s ideas on the 
nature of causality and its relation to life and intelligence. These ideas are 
claimed to complement contemporary approaches to life such as those 
developed by Loewenstein (1999), Maturana & Varela (1980), Maturana 
(1992), Bohm (1980), and others. 
In Part 2, based upon Aristotle’s theory of causation, we then sketch 
a characterization of living organisms in terms of a systemic unity. 
 
1. ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF THE FOUR CAUSES AND ITS META-
PHYSICAL BACKGROUND 
Countless contemporary studies have already pointed out the 
problems that arise from the notion of causation adopted by classical 
mechanics. From the four causes (material, formal, efficient and final) 
initially proposed by Aristotle, only efficient causation has remained since it 
was the only one allowing immediate quantification.  
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On one hand, the possibility of having measurable/quantifiable 
relations between physical bodies was a great contribution provided by 
Physics in the 17th century, but it demanded, on the other hand, that the 
method of qualitative description would be abandoned. Malherbe observes 
(1994, p. 21) “[…] one does not talk anymore about the nature of things, 
but about nature as a system of relations, like a uniform totality of causes 
and effects”. According to Malherbe, the ontological connection that would 
join the individual things to a world full of qualities is lost and reduced to a 
mere set of quantitative relations. 
The immediate implication of such a reduction is that the physical 
reality and its mathematical expression are set apart. In other words, the 
methodological reduction promoted by classical mechanics, initially with 
mere epistemological pretensions, to describe the world adequately, starts to 
play an ontological role: the relations between things are quantifiable within 
the context of efficient causation because the mathematical expressions 
describing the movement of things constitute their essence. In the genesis of 
classical mechanics there seems to be a substitution of quantitative for 
qualitative ontology; with the intent of measuring perfectly, for which 
efficient causation lends itself quite well.  
As we have already pointed out, however, to attribute such an 
ontological role to efficient causation implies distinguishing physics, as 
characterised above, from physis in the sense of nature with its two 
meanings: (1) the totality of beings and (2) the set of properties or qualities 
of a being. In this paper we suggest a reinterpretation of the notion of 
causation in order to recover its four senses originally considered by 
Aristotle: matter, form, movement and direction (Physics, 192 b/194). At the 
same time we claim that it would be necessary to return to a qualitative 
ontology if we want to describe the phenomena that escape from the 
reductionist grip, like for instance phenomena related to life. 
Aristotle (2002) argues that in order to know the properties of natural 
entities or events one has to investigate their causal relations. These apply to 
all natural things composed dynamically by the mixture of matter and form 
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that develops in specific directions. As mentioned, four inseparable causes - 
material, formal, efficient and final - are involved in this mixture. The 
material one corresponds to the basic elements constitutive of organic and 
inorganic matter; the formal one concerns their structure and function; the 
efficient cause sets the changes and all forms of motion; the final cause is 
related to the direction in which changes occur. These four causes always 
operate together in a systemic way, producing everything that exists in 
nature. However, organisms differ from non-living material in that they 
incorporate a principle of self-locomotion, in the Aristotelian sense of 
moving and growing. 
Organisms have the capacity to grow (actualizing their shape mainly 
thanks to the formal cause) and to move by their own means (operating the 
efficient cause). This is possible due to the organism’s nutritional activities 
(by incorporating matter through the material cause) and biochemical 
transferring of kinetic energy (again via efficient cause) that will allow them 
to fulfill the goal of surviving (according to the final cause). As we are going 
to argue in Part 2, this dynamics characterizes a self-organizing process that 
allows a systemic unity, typical of living organisms, connecting its 
constitutive parameters.  
From the Aristotelian perspective of causation, matter organises itself 
dynamically into different structures and directions. This conception is 
particularly connected with the idea of inseparability of matter and form: 
matter is what changes and form is that which has the tendency to change 
(Metaphysics, 1.070a). From such a perspective one can consider the 
dynamism of the physical world in terms of constant transformations (or 
alterations in the case of formal causation) that belong to the coming-to-be 
or becoming where a being loses some properties while acquiring others. 
According to Aristotle, matter as a whole is, potentially, both the opposites 
(Metaphysics, 1.069b 14-15), being and non-being, either accepting form or its 
absence. The direction of the transformations of matter will depend on its 
ability to change inherent potentialities and which depend on its form of 
organization. The passage of potentiality to action is part of the flow of 
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generation and corruption within nature and, especially, living creatures. 
Aristotle also observes that while primary matter or substance can actualise 
itself in various directions, there are limits to the potentiality of actualising 
the form of a given matter. 
According to Aristotle, matter and form are ontologically inseparable; 
it is just within the act of thought that the primary substances can be divided 
into form and matter, underlining the linguistic-conceptual character (or 
epistemological) of such a division. This division has a task to fulfill: it 
allows the classification of beings. The aim of this classification is to 
produce essential definitions of each class. Groups or classes of beings 
constitute, in turn, secondary substances, the objects of knowledge that will be 
investigated causally.  
The method used by Aristotle to group species on the basis of sets of 
properties is the composition; because a definition cannot be about 
individuals, these are not the object of knowledge, as Aristotle points out in 
Metaphysics Z, 15, 1,0401 -, but about groups or sets of beings possessing the 
same essential property. The essence or form defines the borders of the class 
to which different beings belong and it distinguishes each class from others. 
Once a being is correctly classified, this will immediately result in the 
definition of its essence. An example of this kind of classification is the 
definition of human beings as a rational animal. The capacity of reasoning is 
the essential property of the form of human beings, but belongs to all 
humans and not only to an individual. What we would like to emphasize is 
that, even when the individual being is unknowable, its essence - the form as 
object of knowledge - is inseparable from it: according to this line of 
Aristotelian reasoning, the form is inseparable from the body except for in 
thought, as we already observed.  
The knowledge of the four causes allows the classification of beings 
in agreement with their qualities (what they have in common  systemically 
                                                          
1 For Aristotle, the singular being is not the object of knowledge because it is 
subject to generation and corruption. 
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with other beings and what they have specifically for themselves) in order to 
determine their essential definition. Such a definition of essential qualities 
concerns, for Aristotle, the immanent structure (or form, as we saw) of 
classes of beings, the observation of which can start a causal investigation.  
In this context, human beings are considered capable of knowing in 
virtue of having certain sensorial, mnemonic potentialities and immanent 
reflexives: 
 
The animals other than man live by appearances and memories, and have but 
little of connected experience; but the human race lives also by art and 
reasoning. Now from memory experience is produced in men; for the several 
memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single 
experience. And experience seems pretty much like science and art, but really 
science and art come to men through experience […]. (Metaphysics, A, 980b) 
 
We understand that the development of one of the most complex 
human cognitive abilities, for example the inductive reasoning happens, 
according to Aristotle, in function of the unification of similar experiences. 
This unification is possible not only due to the remembrance (memory) of 
each individual experience with the same object or with similar objects, but 
also to the overlap between individual experiences that are unified by 
forgetting specific details. 
This brief summary of the Aristotelian ideas allows us to question a 
set of religiously inclined interpretations of Aristotle that suggest that there 
exists an ontological abyss among living beings because the human reflexive 
capacities are of "divine origin". In contrast, a contemporary reading of the 
above passages allows us to assume that, for Aristotle, there is a 
(quantitative) difference of complexity among living beings, from insects to 
human beings, in virtue of their distinct sensorial and mnemonic capacities 
and not necessarily a qualitative difference. After all, the substantial 
substratum of all beings is the inseparable unity of matter and form. 
When considering his causal doctrine, Aristotle retells the appearance 
of cognitive abilities in their historical order (which was considered 
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irrelevant from the platonic perspective), suggesting a gradual complexification 
of these abilities in living systems in agreement with their sensorial and 
mnemonic capacities. He says, still in Book A of the Metaphysics (980 27 - 980 
b 25): 
 
By nature animals are born with the faculty of sensation, and from sensation 
memory is produced in some of them, though not in others. And therefore 
the former are more intelligent and apt at learning than those which cannot 
remember; those which are incapable of hearing sounds are intelligent 
though they cannot be taught, e.g. the bee, and any other race of animals that 
may be like it; and those which besides memory have this sense of hearing 
can be taught. 
 
The importance attributed to the capacity of communication allows 
us to perceive the cognitive relevance of mutual interaction. However, even 
though animals are capable of hearing, to remember and to take heed of 
voices of command are abilities considered more intelligent. Other animals, 
such as bees, for example, are also considered intelligent. These animals, 
although devoid of hearing, show their intelligence through collective 
systemic actions, as their abilities reveal themselves in their interaction with 
the environment. Here, we have an example of empirical knowledge about 
non-human animals that express their intelligence in everyday behaviour. 
The common element that connects all living organisms seems to be 
the incorporation of self-locomotion abilities that allows the development of 
a systemic order considering both organisms and environment. In what 
follows, we are going to inquire into the main properties of self-organization 
and systemic order. 
 
2. SELF-ORGANIZATION AND SYSTEMIC ORDER 
Grounded on Aristotle’s lessons on the nature of causality, we shall 
now investigate the relation between self-organization and living processes.  
As pointed out in Debrun (1996), D’Ottaviano et al. (2000) and 
Gonzalez & Haselager (2003), the label ‘self-organization’ refers to a process 
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through which new forms of organization may emerge spontaneously from 
the dynamic interaction established between elements that are initially 
independent. The spontaneous characteristic of a self-organizing process 
requires that no a priori plan or central controller should direct the 
development of the process in question: its systemic organization, when it 
happens, should result mainly from the exclusive dynamics of the process of 
interaction between its elements.  
Conventionally, two basic phases can be established in a self-
organizing process (Ashby, 1962 and Debrun, 1996): In the first, known as 
primary self-organization, organic or inorganic elements (with independent 
behaviours) get together, ideally by chance. This casual encounter may 
initiate an interaction amongst independent elements in such a way that they 
become coordinated and interdependent. In this primary phase, 
spontaneous interactions may give place to new forms of organizations. It is 
in this context that Ashby (1962) stresses that a process is “self-organizing in 
the sense that it changes from separated parts to parts joined” without the 
presence of any kind of pre-established program. 
Examples of primary self-organization can be found in processes of 
pattern formation of organic and inorganic matter such as piles of sand, 
cells, molecules, organisms, social groups, etc., which are formed 
spontaneously. Aristotle’s hypotheses, mentioned in Part 1, on the degree of 
complexification of matter involved in living beings seems to illustrate the 
dynamics of primary self-organization: From the mixture of basic non-
organic elements such as minerals, air and water may emerge the basic 
substances that are going to compose the homogeneous parts of animals, 
such as bone and flesh. In this process, even though the activity of 
individual elements may be governed by local constraints, the overall 
emergent pattern expresses a collective effect that is not governed by strictly 
local constraints. Each singular element plays a role in the dynamics of a 
self-organizing process, but its emergent organization (that occurs at a 
higher level) is the product of a singular collective interaction. Furthermore, 
there may be a qualitative, fundamental difference between elements when 
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considered in isolation and collectively. Thus, for example, in the case of 
living beings, as suggested by Aristotle (1997), the combination of basic 
natural elements like earth, air and water may result in the formation of 
bones, tissues and the like. This suggestion allows us to improve aspects of 
contemporary approaches to life characterized as a self-organized process, 
such as the one proposed by Maturana & Varela (1980) concerning 
autopoiesis – the basic unity of life. This concept is defined through a 
definition of “living machines”: 
 
An autopoietic machine is a machine organised (defined as a unity) as a 
network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of 
components that produces the components which: (i) through their 
interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realise the 
network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it 
(the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they (the 
components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realisation as 
such a network (1980, p. 78-79). 
 
One fundamental property of self-organizing processes is that they 
allow the emergence of order parameters. As characterized by Haken (1999, 
2000), order parameters can be described as high-level patterns that result 
from the interaction between low-level components. Once created, order 
parameters constrain (enslave) the behaviour of the low-level components 
from which they originate. These may change, in a circular feedback way, 
the high-level order parameters, as happens, for example, with the behaviour 
of parents: As soon as babies are conceived, their existence changes the 
behaviour of their parents that, in turn, changes the behaviour of the babies 
and so on.  
Through primary self-organization, different forms of organization 
may come to existence, but only a small number of them will evolve. Their 
emergent order parameters are, in general, fragile and unstable; they may 
disappear at any time, because the interaction between the elements at the 
lower level (that allowed their emergence) had no time to adjust, mature or 
to grow in a stable way. Stability, development and preservation of order 
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parameters require training and refined mechanisms of learning and 
adjustment that, in the fullness of time, are going to characterize the second 
phase of self-organization. 
Secondary self-organization involves, amongst others, cooperation, 
competition, circular feedback and, principally, learning mechanisms that are 
fundamental for the dynamics of reciprocal adjustment of parts in their 
mutual systemic interrelations as indicated in Gonzalez & Haselager (2003). 
In the case of living beings, these properties are intrinsically related to the 
flow of information available to organisms as they interact with the 
environment (initially through touch) in their different levels of existence.  
Aristotle’s inquiry into the composition of the parts of animals (in On 
the parts of animals, 1996) illustrates again the dynamics of secondary self-
organization: Once non-organic elements combine, allowing the formation 
of tissues and bones, their combination may give place to more complex 
forms, such as limbs, face and fingers, through the dynamics of interaction 
and adjustments between elements at the lower level. Finally, the persistence 
of the whole organism in the domain of life depends on a complex systemic 
order, acquired through secondary self-organization. Life can be understood 
in terms of self-organizing processes that allow the emergence and evolution 
of systems capable of self-locomotion, in the Aristotelian sense of moving 
and growing. 
 
It could be argued that, according to contemporary Biology, the 
formation of organs does not characterize a self-organizing process because 
genetic pre-establish rules shape, with small variations or mutations, the 
whole process  of interaction  between genes  making  predictable its future 
development into  limbs, face, fingers, etc. 
A possible answer to this objection is that the origins and stability of 
the genetic code itself can be understood in terms of primary self-
organization. As suggested by Loewenstein (1999, p. 36): 
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We begin with the development of carbon chains. […] With the formation of 
asymmetric molecules the channeling of information into molecular 
structures gathered way. The prime movers of that trend were molecules 
with a spine of carbon atoms. These molecules were somewhat lopsided 
from the start; other atoms, at first probably a few, were positioned unevenly 
about that spine. So, these molecules were either left- or right -handed. With 
time, and under the influx of information, the carbon spine got longer and 
the number of the attached atoms, larger, but the original hand remained, 
perpetuated by the inter-molecular transfer of information. So, today every 
biological molecule worth its name has a handedness that is the same in every 
organism, from microbe to man – glucose and amino acids are left-handed, 
the sugar in DNA and RNA are of one hand, proteins corkscrew to the right, 
and so on, to the highest tiers of molecular organization.  
 
If this story is correct, then from the spontaneous interaction 
between carbon-containing molecules a self-replicating matrix emerged. 
Once this matrix came to existence, and became stable through secondary 
self-organization, then different forms of systemic organization started to 
develop culminating with the formation of organisms.  
It should be stressed that an important aspect of this secondary 
process of self-organization is that the elements belonging to different levels 
of complexity grow in the context of the whole organism, which can be seen, 
in its totality, as the highest order parameter originated from the lower level 
components (organic and non-organic). This happens because, as 
mentioned, once order parameters are formed, they constrain the behaviour 
of the components at the lower level from which they originate.  
Another important aspect of the self-organizing process, particularly 
in its secondary phase, is that even though it may involve a certain amount 
of mechanistic order - understood as a sequence governed by pre-
established rules, laws or (genetic) programs, a systemic (not necessarily 
mechanical) kind of organization seems to be fundamental for its 
emergence, development and maintenance (Bresciani Filho and 
D’Ottaviano, 2000). 
 In a similar context, Bohm (1980, p. 173) stresses the systemic 
organization underlying the structure of living organisms:  
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[…] In a living organism … each part grows in the context of the whole, so 
that it does not exist independently, nor ‘interacts’ with the others without 
itself being essentially affected in its relationship. 
 
Furthermore, the irreversible arrow of time that brings novelties in the 
dynamics of interaction between elements is essential to the systemic 
organization that emerges from the spontaneous interaction between its 
constituents. Even though there are relatively stable laws in the system, the 
dynamic characteristic of systemic order includes the irreversible arrow of 
time that shapes its evolutionary path creating a history and opening up new 
possibilities for the unfolding of its “implicate order” (Bohm, 1980, p. 177). 
This sketched view of self-organization together with the Aristotelian 
conception of causation open up new perspectives to understand the 
contemporary notion of life initially characterized in terms of a self-
replicating matrix. Furthermore, the presupposition of a systemic 
organization connecting patterns that evolve in accordance with the 
irreversible arrow of time allows us to characterize the living processes as an 
evolutionary, self-organized process. 
 
3. FINAL COMMENTS 
We have stressed in this paper that the Aristotelian theory of causality 
is fundamentally systemic in that each cause is mutually dependent on the 
others, and they operate together to preserve the holistic organization of 
nature. It was only in the seventh century that Galileo (followed by 
Descartes, Newton and many others) abolished the notion of final and 
material causes in the investigations of nature. By considering that “the laws 
of nature are written in the language of mathematics”, Galileo preserved (for 
reasons that are not very relevant here) only the formal and efficient 
conceptions of causes. The first one was preserved because mathematical 
descriptions provide powerful tools to describe physical phenomena; the 
second one accounts for physical phenomena that can be measured with 
high precision. Material and final causes disappear in Galileo’s description of 
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nature, and with them the qualitative aspects of the physical and, especially, 
the biological (intentional) worlds.  
By recovering the Aristotelian scenario, we believe that it is possible 
to understand the relation between self-organization and life from a systemic 
contemporary view. It can be argued that teleological suppositions could be 
problematic in relation to the central hypotheses of the theory of self-
organization, for how could self-organized systems include pre-established 
purposes as implicit in the Aristotelian theory of causality? However, 
according to the Aristotelian theory of four causes the purposes are 
gradually established and dynamically actualized in consonance with the 
system’s own potentialities and the general conditions of the environment. 
In the same way, the purposes of self-organized processes are manifested by 
their own paths as time puts together matter and form. 
Finally, it could also be argued that by insisting on the importance of 
Aristotle’s conception of final cause, we are reproducing the teleological 
fallacy, well known amongst scientists, and its undesirable theological 
ideology. It is possible to consider that Aristotle’s teleology is actually a kind 
of theology, and that the general purpose of actions results from God’s 
determination. However, this is only one (the religious) interpretation of the 
Aristotelian conception of teleology. As stressed by Halper (1999): 
“Aristotle’s view shows that ‘purpose in nature’ need not mean a higher 
purpose beyond nature” (p. 906). This view is developed in detail by Jaeger’s 
(1997) non-religious interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology, according to 
which the general organization of natural, biological and social phenomena 
can be understood from the Aristotelian principle of unity of the four causes. 
The dynamical influence of the efficient cause allows the actualization of 
matter/form (material and efficient causes) that occurs in some specific 
direction (final cause). Moreover, we can consider that all organisms develop 
common forms of adjustments over large timescales, and that this co-
existence could generate some kind of natural (self-organized, we can say 
today) harmony, in Aristotle’s sense. 
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Supposing, with Aristotle, that everything in nature could be 
understood from the perspective that integrates the four causes, one 
question to be further investigated could be: what is the contribution of the 
theory of self-organization for the contemporary systemic view that 
integrates life and causation? This essay sketched an answer to this question; 
time may help us to discover a more developed and integrated answer to it. 
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